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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

de•novo

NEW MODELS FOR PROSECUTORIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
Ellen Yaroshefsky †

There has been significant and increasing attention to prosecutorial
accountability for misconduct in recent years by courts and disciplinary
authorities, in some prosecutors’ offices and by defense organizations,
in academia, and of course, in popular media. 1 In great measure, this
attention is the result of the remarkable work of the Innocence Project
and Innocence networks around the country. 2 It is also the result of
awakening to the fault lines in the criminal justice system—such as
mass incarceration—and to the disproportionate targeting of black and
brown people for arrest and prosecution. 3 Of course, this attention is all
exacerbated by the Internet, which makes stories available nearly
instantaneously in various social platforms. 4 The attention has sparked a
call to examine the conduct of prosecutors, notably in cases of
exonerations. 5
† Ellen Yaroshefsky is a Clinical Professor of Law and the Director of the Jacob Burns
Center for Ethics in the Practice of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
1 Bruce A. Green and Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 94 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1–3) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2722791).
2 Id. at 40–42.
3 Id. at 60.
4 Id.
5 Radley Balko, Another Orleans Parish Man Freed Due to Prosecutor Misconduct, WASH.
POST (May 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/05/12/anotherorleans-parish-man-freed-due-to-prosecutor-misconduct (describing the release of Reginald
Adams, convicted because of the Orleans Parish prosecution’s “intentional prosecutorial
misconduct,” which was a recurring problem under the former District Attorney’s leadership);
Radley Balko, The Untouchables: America’s Misbehaving Prosecutors, and the System that
Protects Them, HUFFINGTON POST (August 5, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/
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Many of the exoneration cases were the results of prosecutors or
their agents hiding evidence of innocence—perhaps the most egregious
form of prosecutorial misconduct. John Thompson, the Louisiana man
nearly put to death for a homicide and robbery that he did not commit—
and the man who had his $14 million dollar civil rights verdict
overturned by the Supreme Court in Connick v. Thompson—visited
Cardozo Law School some years ago to talk about the egregious
prosecutorial misconduct in his case; the prosecutor, among other acts,
hid blood evidence by taking the blood swab home with him. 6 John
repeatedly asked, “what should happen to prosecutors who do this to
people’s lives and significantly, what can change systems to avoid this
in the future?”
We explored these questions at our symposium, 7 and the following
pieces will do so too. Of course one must always start by asking the
question, “what do we mean by misconduct?” It would seem that it
would be a simple term to define, but as we all know it is not.
Prosecutors’ offices, courts, and disciplinary authorities are charged
with and want to hold prosecutors accountable when their conduct
strays from the proverbial mission to “do justice,” or as the Supreme
Court famously said in Berger v. United States, they strike foul blows
instead of fair ones, but that is much too vague a concept.8
The term “misconduct” has been used to refer to a wide range of
conduct and its definition depends upon the context. 9 For appellate
purposes, prosecutorial misconduct encapsulates not only the actions of
the individual prosecutors, but also the failure of various law
enforcement agencies to disclose information to the prosecutor. The
prosecutor herself may have been diligent, but the agency’s failure to
comply with the law is termed “prosecutorial misconduct.”10
08/01/prosecutorial-misconduct-new-orleans-louisiana_n_3529891.html (examining the Orleans
Parish prosecution’s suppression of evidence leading to the wrongful conviction of John
Thompson, describing other misconduct in the same office, and referring to similar misconduct
by other prosecutors’ offices); Michael Powell, Misconduct by Prosecutors, Once Again, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/14/nyregion/new-charge-ofprosecutorial-misconduct-in-queens.html; John Terzano, The Devastating Consequences of
Prosecutorial Misconduct, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
john-terzano/the-devastating-consequen_b_161049.html (discussing the Justice Project’s
“Prosecutorial Accountability: A Policy Review,” which recommends comprehensive reform, and
urging harsher punishment for prosecutorial misconduct).
6 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011).
7 The Innocence Project, the Jacob Burns Center for Ethics in the Practice of Law, the Center
for Rights and Justice at Cardozo School of Law, and the Cardozo Law Review, Symposium:
New Models for Prosecutorial Accountability (Apr. 21, 2016).
8 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“[The prosecutor] may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”).
9 Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 1, at 3–10.
10 See, e.g., State v. Maluia, 108 P.3d 974, 979 (Haw. 2005) (observing that “‘prosecutorial
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Prosecutors often bristle at the use of the term “misconduct” in the
context of a law enforcement agency failure because, in popular
parlance, misconduct carries with it a notion of that lawyer’s intentional
wrongdoing. A better term might be government misconduct. 11
As an ethical obligation enforced by disciplinary rules, the term
misconduct refers generally to a violation of any ethics rule. In
particular at the symposium, we discussed violations of Model Rule
3.8(d), regarding the prosecutorial obligation to disclose favorable
information. 12 And of course there is the question of whether the
misconduct rises to a certain level of mens rea: is it intentional, gross
negligence, recklessness, or negligent conduct that we refer to? Is
conscious avoidance of information a reason to hold prosecutors
accountable?
Journalists, and the media more generally, rarely define the term
misconduct and may use it to refer to a host of issues. We did not
address these varying definitions, nor did we approach a definition of
misconduct at the symposium, although we referenced these issues
throughout our discussion. Instead, this conference focused primarily on
the most egregious conduct in the truth seeking process. Various courts
misconduct’ is a legal term of art that refers to any improper action committed by a prosecutor,
however harmless or unintentional” (emphasis in original)).
11 Prosecutors have urged a distinction between misconduct and error. See, e.g.,
Memorandum from John Kingrey, Exec. Dir., Minn. Cty. Att’ys Ass’n., to Minn. Cty. Att’ys
(Apr. 25, 2007), https://www.scribd.com/document/184897697/2007-05-17-Prosecutorial-ErrorMemo5-17-07. Without necessarily agreeing that intentional misconduct is aberrational, the
American Bar Association has supported prosecutors’ efforts to persuade judges to use the term
“error” rather than “misconduct” in reference to prosecutors’ unintentional violations of law.
Charles Joseph Hynes, Recommendation 100B, 2010 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST., http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2010_am_100b.authcheckdam.pdf.
12 Model Rule 3.8(d) requires the prosecutor to:
[M]ake timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in
connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged
mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved
of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). The critique of lack of
discipline for prosecutorial ethical violations is robust despite the language in Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 66 (2011) (“An attorney who violates his or her ethical obligations is
subject to professional discipline, including sanctions, suspension, and disbarment.”). See also
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (“[A] prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among
officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to
professional discipline by an association of his peers.”); State ex rel. Okla. Bar v. Miller, 309 P.3d
108, 120 (Okla. 2013) (noting that “[i]nstances of prosecutorial misconduct from previous
decades, such as withholding evidence, were often met with nothing more than a reprimand or a
short suspension. Some scholars writing during that time theorized that discipline was imposed so
rarely and so lightly that it was not effective in deterring misconduct.” (footnote omitted)); Neil
Gordon, Misconduct and Punishment: State Disciplinary Authorities Investigate Prosecutors
Accused of Misconduct, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), http://
www.publicintegrity.org/2003/06/26/5532/misconduct-and-punishment. See generally CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR: INVESTIGATING AMERICA’ S LOCAL P ROSECUTORS (2003).
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and disciplinary authorities have referred to this as “significant
misconduct,” “egregious misconduct,” or “substantial violations.” In
most instances, what we discussed was the intentional or grossly
negligent failure to disclose information that negates guilt or mitigates
punishment.
The symposium focused upon both the legal obligation and the
ethical obligation to disclose. For shorthand, in state and federal courts
we often call these “Brady violations,” although the contours of the
legal obligation pursuant to Brady v. Maryland and subsequent cases are
often subject to dispute. Beyond the legal obligation, we also discussed
the ethical obligation to disclose information that is broader than the
legal obligation in most state and federal courts. 13 Many of our
panelists, notably on the first panel, focused on cases involving such
ethical violations. 14
We also acknowledged that there is a difference in perception of
the extent of misconduct between prosecutors and defense lawyers and,
perhaps, by judges and the public. 15 Most prosecutors, notably those
who were in attendance at the symposium, work hard to develop
systems and practices for the lawyers in their offices to insure best
procedures for doing justice and appearing to do justice. They believe
the misconduct problem is overblown and the result of rogue
individuals, and in some instances, inadequate training and supervision,
and unhelpful office culture.
Others, however, believe the issue to be of greater magnitude for
which evidence cannot be readily uncovered. Many point out that Brady
issues are a hidden problem because about 95% of cases result in guilty
pleas, thus leaving us with few accountability mechanisms to determine
whether evidence was disclosed.16 Recent exonerations of persons who
plead guilty demonstrate the problem all too clearly. 17
Recently Judge Kozinski in the Ninth Circuit famously called this
problem an “epidemic.” 18 But the term does not capture its unknowable
13 See generally Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices, New Perspectives on Brady
and Other Disclosure Obligations, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961 (2010) [hereinafter Cardozo
Symposium].
14 The first panel, “The Role of Bar Discipline,” included Laura Popps from the State Bar of
Texas, Elizabeth Herman from the Bar of the District of Columbia, and Tracy Kepler, immediate
past president of the National Organization of Bar Counsel.
15 Ellen Yaroshefsky, Foreword: New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure
Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1943 (2010).
16 Id.
17 Daniel Beekman, Judge Jed Rakoff Says Plea-Deal Process is Broken, Offers Solution,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 27, 2014 2:30 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/judgeplea-deal-process-fixed-article-1.1806358#ixzz32v9wIJO4; Rob Warden, Christopher Ochoa:
DNA Exonerated Christopher Ochoa of a Crime to which he had Confessed, CTR. ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/
tx/christopher-ochoa.html.
18 United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626, 631–32 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J.,
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scope. Brady errors are not an “epidemic” in the sense of tuberculosis or
any kind of virus. They may however exist in significant numbers as a
result of systems and practices, as well as office culture.
Prosecutors bristle at the notion of an epidemic or a systemic
problem and instead believe that the problem is episodic. This
contention is the subject of ongoing discussion and debate. These
discussions are interesting, but our view is that we will not reach
resolution in the criminal justice system about the extent of the
problem. 19 Primarily, it is a hidden problem because we do not know in
the guilty pleas—that are fundamental to our criminal justice system—
whether there is evidence or information that should have been
disclosed but was not. Nor do our systems provide effective
mechanisms to insure disclosure for cases that go to trial except in rare
instances.
Instead we think we are finally at a point where, hopefully, we no
longer need to reach resolution about the extent of the problem because
we acknowledge that no matter how extensive, it is a problem, it needs
to be fixed, and it can be fixed. Many jurisdictions, or at least some
jurisdictions, are working towards solutions. 20 This is why this
conference is styled “New Models of Prosecutorial Accountability.”
We set out to explore these solutions throughout the conference.
We looked at disciplinary systems, judicial control over prosecutorial
conduct, and internal systems within the prosecutors’ offices. We asked
questions such as the extent to which we could avoid such problems
through open file discovery, 21 and by establishing computer-based
systems with information flowing directly from the police to the
prosecutor, so that it is not a guessing-system of what needs to be
disclosed. 22
Some jurisdictions lead the way—like certain Texas counties—
through legislation, within certain prosecutors’ offices, and within its
disciplinary systems. 23 However, the progress is spotty across the
dissenting).
19 Yaroshefsky, supra note 15 at 1945.
20 Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 1, at 24–27, 32–33 nn.183–187 (discussion of
Conviction Integrity Units).
21 North Carolina adopted an open file discovery system. A study of the statute’s
implementation found that open file discovery increases the “fairness, finality, and efficiency of
criminal adjudications.” Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After Connick
and Garcetti, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1332 (2012).
22 Yaroshefsky, supra note 15 at 1953–54.
23 See, e.g., Michael Morton Act, S.B. 1611, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013); Randall Sims,
The Dawn of New Discovery Rules, 43 THE PROSECUTOR No. 4 (July-August 2013), http://
www.tdcaa.com/journal/dawn-new-discovery-rules; Jeremy Rosenthal, How the Michael Morton
Act Overhauls the Texas Criminal Discovery Process, https://roselawtx.wordpress.com/2013/05/
17/how-the-michael-morton-act-overhauls-the-texas-criminal-discovery-process (last visited Aug.
1, 2016). Some individual prosecutors did grouse both before and after the law was enacted. See,
e.g., Terry Breen, New Discovery Statute SB 1611, TDCAA (May 23, 2013 4:32 PM), http://
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country and entrenched cultures in other systems make progress or
accountability difficult. In some jurisdictions, there are conviction
integrity units that actually function to explore the root causes of
convictions. 24 The Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of
Justice recently produced a report about effective conviction integrity
units. 25
Finally, there are two caveats. At the symposium, we focused only
on prosecutors, although we know that defense lawyers’ actions and
inactions contribute to and cause wrongful convictions. When defense
lawyers engage in misconduct because they lack fundamental
competency and diligence that is required by the ethics rules, it is called
ineffective assistance of counsel. Prosecutors balk at the notion that the
defense’s conduct is not termed “misconduct,” while the prosecution is
charged with misconduct even in circumstances where the individual
lawyer is not blameworthy. The terminology is a function of the
Constitution and the law. It is obvious, but it bears repeating, that the
respective roles of the prosecution and defense are different and we only
focused upon the prosecutor’s role—the party with the responsibility of
the minister of justice.
Second, we acknowledged at the outset that there is a distinction
between misconduct and prosecutorial error. Our last panel discussed
systems and practices to reduce both error and misconduct. The goal of
the conference is to promote development of systems and practices to
reduce both error and misconduct. We hope that throughout the day,
interesting exchanges among panelists and attendees sparked ideas and
promoted action to improve our practices.

tdcaa.infopop.net/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/157098965/m/7457055016?r=8787055016#8787055016.
24 See, e.g., Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need
Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215 (2010).
25 John Hollway, Conviction Review Units: A National Perspective, QUATTRONE CTR. FOR
THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, U. PENN. L. SCH. (2016), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/
5522-cru-final.

